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HOW SHOULD WE SCORE ATHLETES AND CANDIDATES:
GEOMETRIC SCORING RULES
ALEKSEI Y. KONDRATEV, EGOR IANOVSKI, AND ALEXANDER S. NESTEROV
Abstract. Individual rankings are often aggregated using scoring rules: each position
in each ranking brings a certain score; the total sum of scores determines the aggregate
ranking. We study whether scoring rules can be robust to adding or deleting particular
candidates, as occurs with spoilers in political elections and with athletes in sports due
to doping allegations. In general the result is negative, but weaker robustness criteria pin
down a one-parameter family of geometric scoring rules with the scores 0, 1, 1 + p, 1 + p +
p
2
, . . .. These weaker criteria are independence from deleting unanimous winner (e.g., doping
allegations) and independence from deleting unanimous loser (e.g., spoiler candidates). This
family generalises three central rules: the Borda rule, the plurality rule and the antiplurality
rule. For illustration we use recent events in biathlon; our results give simple instruments
to design scoring rules for a wide range of applications.
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Introduction
The 2014-2015 IBU Biathlon World Cup took place over a series of races in the winter of
2014/2015. At the end of each race the competitors were ranked in the order they finished,
and assigned a number of points based on their position in that order. The scores for the
first thirteen positions are 60, 54, 48, 43, 40, 38, 36, 34, 32, 31, 30, 29, 28. The scores the
athletes won are summed across the races, and the one with the highest score is declared the
winner – a procedure that is known as a scoring rule.
The Women’s Pursuit category consists of seven races. Kaisa Ma¨ka¨ra¨inen came first with
two first place finishes, two second, a third, a fourth, and a twelfth, for a total score of 348
points. Second was Darya Domracheva, with four first place finishes, one fourth, a seventh,
and a thirteenth, for a total score of 347. In tenth place was Ekaterina Glazyrina, well out
of the running with 190 points. These results are given in Table 1.
Table 1. Women’s Pursuit results of the 2014-2015 Biathlon
Athlete R1 R2 R3 R4 R5 R6 R7 Total
Ma¨ka¨ra¨inen 60 60 54 48 54 29 43 348
Domracheva 43 28 60 60 60 36 60 347
...
Glazyrina 32 54 10 26 38 20 10 190
Four years later, Glazyrina was disqualified for doping violations, and all her results from
2013 were annulled. This bumped Domracheva’s thirteenth place finish in race two into a
twelfth, and her total score to 348. The number of first place finishes is used as a tie breaker,
and in March 2019 it was announced that Ma¨ka¨ra¨inen will be stripped of the Small Crystal
Globe trophy in favour of Domracheva.1 Because the tenth place competitor was disqualified
for doping four years after the fact.
Clearly there is something unsatisfying about this. We would hope that the relative
ranking of Ma¨ka¨ra¨inen and Domracheva depends solely on the relative performance of the
two athletes, and not on whether or not a third party was convicted of doping, especially if
said third party was not a serious contender for the title.
In this paper we will discuss a few classical results from social choice theory which describe
why this is impossible, and suggest the best possible course of action left to us given the
mathematical impossibilities we face. This involves introducing two extremely weak inde-
pendence axioms, which turn out to characterise a one-parameter family of scoring rules –
the geometric scoring rules.
1Eventually IBU decided that both athletes get the first place:
https://www.biathlonworld.com/competitions/world-cup/standings/season/1415/level/1/score/pu/gender/w/
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Suppose we have a set of m athletes and the results for n races, R1, . . . , Rn. Ri is the
order in which the athletes finished race i. What we are after is a procedure which will
transform the n race results into a single ranking for the entire competition, R: a function
(R1, . . . , Rn) 7→ R. We are not looking for an arbitrary function, but the end result R must
reflect the results of the individual races in some way. A minimal condition is unanimity – if
athlete a finishes ahead of athlete b in every race, we should expect a to rank above b in R.
Motivated by the scenario in the introduction, we also want the relative ranking of a and b
in the end result to depend only on the relative ranking of a and b in the individual races, a
condition known as the independence of irrelevant alternatives. Here we hit the most famous
result in social choice theory – Arrow’s result that the only function that meets our criteria
is dictatorship (Arrow, 1950).
Now, social choice theory is prone to colourful nomenclature, so it is important to underline
that the characteristic feature of dictatorship is not jackboots and moustaches, but that all
decisions stem from a single individual. In the case of a sporting competition, this could be
the case where the first n− 1 races are treated as warm-ups or friendly races, and only the
finals Rn contributes to the final ranking R. This is not necessarily an absurd system, but
it will not do if we want to keep viewers interested over the course of the event, rather than
just the finals. We need to relax independence.
A weaker independence condition we may consider is independence of winners/losers, also
known as local independence of irrelevant alternatives. As the name suggests, this is the
condition that if we disqualify the top or the bottom athlete in the final ranking R, the
remainder of the ranking remains unchanged. This could be a pressing issue if the winner is
accused of doping, and a rule that satisfies this condition will guarantee that the cup is given
to the runner up without requiring a retallying of the scores. In the case of the loser, there
is the additional concern that it is a lot easier to add a loser to a race than a winner, and
if the authors were to take their skis off the shelf and lose ingloriously in the next Biathlon,
one would hope that the standing of the real competitors would remain unaffected.
It turns out that, given some standard assumptions, there is a unique rule that satisfies
this – the Kemeny rule (Kemeny, 1959; Young, 1988). The procedure is rather complicated
so we shall not describe it here – which is one of its disadvantages, sporting fans will have to
accept the results produced by what is essentially a black box. It is also a difficult procedure
computationally (Bartholdi et al., 1989), so even working out the winner may not be feasible.
But perhaps most damning of all is that it violates a property known as electoral consistency.
Suppose a biathlete comes first in every category of the championship (sprint, pursuit, and
so on). It is reasonable to require that a ranking procedure guarantees she will also come
first overall. The Kemeny rule does not.
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In fact, the only rules that guarantee electoral consistency are the scoring rules (Smith,
1973; Young, 1975). It seems there is no alternative to the rules actually used in Biathlon,
Formula One, the Tour de France, and other events in this format – but that is not necessarily
a bad thing. Scoring rules are easy to compute and understand, and every additional result
contributes to the overall ranking in a predictable way, all of which are very desirable for a
sporting event.
We have seen that neither of the independence notions we have defined so far can apply
here, but how bad can the situation get? The answer is, as bad as possible. A theorem
of Fishburn (1981) shows that for any monotone decreasing series of scores whatsoever, it
is possible to construct a sequence of race results such that if one athlete is removed the
remaining order is not only changed, but inverted. So while Ma¨ka¨ra¨inen may not be pleased
with the current turn of events, there is a possible biathlon where after the disqualification
of Glazyrina Ma¨ka¨ra¨inen finished last, and Domracheva second to last. It is interesting to
speculate whether the competition authorities would have had the resolve to carry through
such a reordering if it had taken place.
Results
In order to motivate our final notion of independence, let us first consider why the results
of the biathlon may not be as paradoxical as they may appear at first glance. After all, if
we can’t prevent violations of independence from taking place, we could at least have an
explanation ready. Note that removing Glazyrina from the ranking in Table 1 changed the
results of Domracheva but not of Ma¨ka¨ra¨inen. In other words Ma¨ka¨ra¨inen outperformed
Domracheva when it came to beating Glazyrina, which edged her into first place, but since
Glazyrina is no longer considered a valid competitor that edge is removed.
So suppose then that the removed athlete is symmetric in her performance vis-a`-vis the
others. In other words she either came last in every race, and is thus a unanimous loser, or
came first, and is a unanimous winner. Surely disqualifying such an athlete cannot change
the final outcome? Why, yes it can.
The results for the Women’s Individual category of the 2013-2014 IBU Biathlon World
Cup are given in the left panel of Table 2. The event consists of two races, and Gabriela
Soukalova´ came first in both, and is thus a unanimous winner, followed by Darya Dom-
racheva, Anastasiya Kuzmina, Nadezhda Skardino, and Franziska Hildebrand. However, in
the hypothetical event of Soukalova´ being disqualified the result is different: the recalcu-
lated scores are in the right panel of Table 2. Domracheva takes gold and Kuzmina silver as
expected, but Hildebrand passes Skardino to take the bronze.2
2The results given in Table 2 are before a disqualification of another Russian athlete Iourieva that occurred
few months past the last race. With the most recent scores, in the right panel, Hildebrand would tie Skardino
by score and beat her via tie-breaking.
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Table 2. Women’s Individual results of the 2013-2014 Biathlon
Athlete R1 R2 Total
Soukalova´ 60 60 120
Domracheva 38 54 92
Kuzmina 54 30 84
Skardino 36 36 72
Hildebrand 28 43 71
Athlete R1 R2 Total
Soukalova´ 60 60 120
Domracheva 40 60 100
Kuzmina 60 31 91
Hildebrand 29 48 77
Skardino 38 38 76
Notes : The left panel presents the official results; the right panel presents the results after a hypothetical
disqualification of Soukalova´.
However, in contrast to the previous paradoxes, this is one we can do something about.
By picking the right set of scores we can ensure that the unanimous loser will come last, the
unanimous winner first, and dropping either will leave the remaining order unchanged.
Let us formalise our two axioms.
An athlete is a unanimous loser just if the athlete is ranked last in every race. A scoring
rule satisfies independence of unanimous losers if unanimous loser is ranked last in the
overall ranking, and removing unanimous loser from every race leaves the overall ranking of
the other athletes unchanged.
Symmetrically, an athlete is a unanimous winner when ranked first in every race. In-
dependence of unanimous winners is satisfied if unanimous winner is ranked first in the
overall ranking, and removing unanimous winner from every race leaves the overall ranking
of the other athletes unchanged.
Before we proceed, we observe that the order produced by a scoring rule is invariant under
scaling and translation, e.g. the scores 4, 3, 2, 1 produce the same order as 8, 6, 4, 2 or 5,
4, 3, 2. We will thus say that scores s1, . . . , sm and t1, . . . , tm are linearly equivalent if there
exists an α > 0 and a β such that si = αti + β.
Next, observe that hitherto we have not been precise about how we go about recalculating
the scores when an athlete has been dropped. The issue is that if we use the values s1, . . . , sm
to score m athletes, if we remove an athlete we are left with m scores and m − 1 athletes.
In principle we need another set of t1, . . . , tm−1 scores to score m − 1 athletes, though in
practice most sporting events simply obtain the ti values by trimming the first sequence, i.e.
t1, . . . , tm−1 = s1, . . . , sm−1, and sm is dropped.
The intuition behind the following result is clear: t1, . . . , tk produces the same ranking of
the first/last k athletes, if and only if it is linearly equivalent to the first/last k scores in the
original system.
Theorem 1. Suppose a scoring rule uses scores sm1 , . . . , s
m
m to score m athletes. The scoring
rule satisfies independence of unanimous losers if and only if sm1 > . . . > s
m
m and the scores for
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k athletes, sk1, . . . , s
k
k, are linearly equivalent to the first k scores for m athletes, s
m
1 , . . . , s
m
k ,
for all k ≤ m.
The rule satisfies independence of unanimous winners if and only if sm1 > . . . > s
m
m and
the scores for k athletes, sk1, . . . , s
k
k, are linearly equivalent to the last k scores for m athletes,
smm−k+1, . . . , s
m
m, for all k ≤ m.
Now we see why the biathlon scores are vulnerable to dropping unanimous winners but
not unanimous losers – since the scores for a smaller number of athletes are obtained by
trimming the full list, every subsequence of the list of scores is indeed equivalent to itself.
However if we drop the winner, then the subsequence 60, 54, 48, . . . , is certainly not linearly
equivalent to 54, 48, 43, . . . .
What happens when we combine the two conditions? Given that we need not distinguish
scores up to scaling and translation we can assume that the score for the last place, sm, is
zero, and sm−1 = 1. The third-to-last athlete must then get a larger number of points than
1, say 1 + p. Now we have a sequence 0, 1, 1+ p, and we know it must be linearly equivalent
to the sequence 1, 1 + p, sm−3. Since the only way to obtain the second sequence from the
first is to scale by p and add 1, it follows that sm−3 = 1+ p+ p
2 and so on. The formula for
the score of the jth position is sj = (p
m−j − 1)/(p− 1). This gives us the following family
of scoring rules.
Theorem 2. A scoring rule satisfies independence of unanimous winners and losers if and
only if it is a generalised geometric rule. That is, it is defined with respect to a parameter
p, and the score of the jth position is linearly equivalent to:
sj =


pm−j p > 1
m− j p = 1
1− pm−j p < 1
This narrow class includes three famous rules as boundary cases. As p approaches infinity,
the first position dominates all the others and we have the generalised plurality rule, also
known as the lexicographic voting rule or the medal count ranking. With p = 1 we have
the Borda rule, proposed by one of the founders of the mathematical study of elections
(de Borda, 1781). As p approaches 0, we have the generalised antiplurality rule.
Our results have straightforward generalisations. We can generalise independence from re-
moving unanimous winner to independence from removing unanimous winning clique: when
some k candidates take top k positions in each individual ranking, removing the clique should
not affect the ranking. We can do the same for independence from removing unanimous los-
ing clique. The geometric scoring rules satisfy both generalised criteria.3
3Here we could use FIA Formula One World Championship as another motivating example. In the seasons
2016-2019 six drivers from three top teams typically claim six top positions (in arbitrary order) and receive
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Discussion
Scoring rules are used in areas far beyond sports competitions. Many countries use scoring
rules in political elections: most of them use plurality, while Slovenia, Nauru and Kiribati
use non-plurality scores. The Eurovision Song Contest uses a scoring system to aggregate
collective judgements of viewers from different nations. Universities across the world use
scoring rules to elect members of student and faculty commities.4
It is likely that scoring rules are popular because of their simplicity. Yet the task of
choosing a specific scoring rule for a given problem is a daunting one, as one must choose
m numbers more or less arbitrarily. Some applications call for convex scores, as in case of
competitions that favour exceptional performance and do not give much weight to failures.
Other applications, such as ranking job candidates or, more generally, designing composite
indicator for objects with multi-dimensional characteristics, require more balanced weighting
while a failure in at least one dimension can be fatal; such applications call for concave scores.
The practical relevance of our paper is that if the reader accepts that our two axioms are
desirable – and they are very natural axioms – then the problem is reduced to choosing a
single parameter p. Despite this simplicity, the resulting family is very broad: not only it
includes a continuum of convex and concave scores, but also the three of the most popular
scoring rules: the Borda count, the generalised plurality and the generalised antiplurality.
Future research can be devoted to finding desirable axioms or specific applications that
pin down a particular parameter p. The literature provides multiple characterisations of the
Borda count, but convex and concave rules did not receive much attention yet.5
To our knowledge, in social choice theory this is the first characterisation not of a specific
scoring rule, but of a non-trivial family. Similar umbrella-like results would also be interesting
and desirable.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. The “if” part is straightforward. Let us prove the “only if” part.
For a fixed k ≤ m, consider a profile Pk consisting of just one race, a1 ≻ . . . ≻ ak. By
independence of unanimous losers, ak must come last, so s
k
k < s
k
i for all i < k. Moreover, the
ranking of a1, . . . , ak−1 must be the same as the ranking in the profile Pk−1 with the single
race a1 ≻ . . . ≻ ak−1. By independence of unanimous losers, ak−1 must come last in Pk−1,
so ak−1 must come second-to-last in Pk, and thus s
k
k−1 < s
k
i for all i < k − 1. By repeating
this argument we establish that sk1 > . . . > s
k
k for all k ≤ m.
25,18,15,12,10,8 points. While other fourteen drivers fight for the rest four profitable positions from 7th to
10th receiving 6,4,2,1 points.
4For instance, Harvard university uses the Borda count to elect the undergraduate council:
https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2018/9/10/uc-voting-system
5See Chebotarev and Shamis (1998) for an extensive overview of previous axiomatisations of scoring rules.
HOW SHOULD WE SCORE ATHLETES AND CANDIDATES: GEOMETRIC SCORING RULES 8
Having established that the scores must be strictly decreasing, consider sm1 , . . . , s
m
k and
sk1, . . . , s
k
k. Let α = (s
m
1 − s
m
2 )/(s
k
1 − s
k
2) and β = (s
k
1s
m
2 − s
k
2s
m
1 )/(s
k
1 − s
k
2). Observe that the
scores αsk1 + β, . . . , αs
k
k + β are linearly equivalent to s
k
1, . . . , s
k
k, and moreover:
αsk1 + β =
sm1 − s
m
2
sk1 − s
k
2
sk1 +
sk1s
m
2 − s
k
2s
m
1
sk1 − s
k
2
=
sm1 s
k
1 − s
m
1 s
k
2
sk1 − s
k
2
= sm1 ,
αsk2 + β =
sm1 − s
m
2
sk1 − s
k
2
sk2 +
sk1s
m
2 − s
k
2s
m
1
sk1 − s
k
2
=
sm2 s
k
1 − s
m
2 s
k
2
sk1 − s
k
2
= sm2 .
It remains to show that αski + β = s
m
i for i = 3, . . . , k to prove that the scores are linearly
equivalent. For convenience, we write ti = αs
k
i + β for i = 3, . . . , k.
Suppose for contradiction that ti > s
m
i (the case where ti < s
m
i is analogous).
Choose integers ni > 0 and n1 such that:
(1)
sm2 − ti
sm1 − s
m
2
<
n1
ni
<
sm2 − s
m
i
sm1 − s
m
2
.
Let n = |n1|+ ni. Construct a profile with 3n races and m athletes as follows.
If n1 ≤ 0, then in n − ni races a has position 1 and b has position 2. In ni races a has
position 1 and b has position i. In n races a has position 2 and b has position i. In −n1 races
a has position i and b has position 2. In n + n1 races a has position i and b has position 1.
If n1 > 0, then in n races a has position 1 and b has position i. In ni races a has position 2
and b has position i. In n− ni races a has position 2 and b has position 1. In ni + n1 races
a has position i and b has position 1.
In both cases there are m − k athletes who come last in the order ak+1 ≻ . . . ≻ am in
every race, and the other athletes are ranked arbitrarily.
Observe than in a profile so constructed athlete a finishes n times in positions 1, 2, i.
Athlete b finishes first n+n1 times, second n−n1−ni times, and ith n+ni times. The score
of a is thus nsm1 +ns
m
2 +ns
m
i and the score of b is (n+n1)s
m
1 +(n−n1−ni)s
m
2 +(n+ni)s
m
i .
The difference between the scores of a and b is (nis
m
2 − nis
m
i ) − (n1s
m
1 − n1s
m
2 ), which is
positive by formula (1). Thus, a beats b.
Now suppose we drop ak+1, . . . , am from the races. Now the score of a is linearly equivalent
to nsm1 +ns
m
2 +nti, and the score of b is linearly equivalent to (n+n1)s
m
1 +(n−n1−ni)s
m
2 +
(n + ni)ti. This gives us a difference of (nis
m
2 − niti) − (n1s
m
1 − n1s
m
2 ) < 0, meaning that
dropping the unanimous losers made b overtake a.
The argument for independence of unanimous winners is analogous. 
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